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TEAM PHYSICIANS AS CO-EMPLOYEES: A PRESCRIPTION THAT 
DEPRIVES PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES OF AN ADEQUATE 
REMEDY FOR SPORTS MEDICINE MALPRACTICE 
MATTHEW J. MITTEN* 
Playing-field injuries and related illnesses are an inherent part of 
professional sports that are assumed by players.  At the major league level, 
professional players in most team sports have unionized and have shifted the 
costs of medical treatment for these injuries to their respective teams.  Players’ 
unions have collectively bargained for contractual rights that require league 
clubs to provide and pay for medical treatment for players’ injuries and 
illnesses suffered within the scope of their employment.1 
Each club typically selects a local doctor or group of doctors, usually 
specialists in orthopedic or internal medicine with expertise and experience in 
sports medicine, to serve as its team physician(s).2  Because being a team 
physician for a professional sports team is prestigious and often results in a 
corresponding increase in non-athlete patients and more overall revenue, many 
sports medicine physicians seek to provide medical care to professional 
athletes.3  It is not uncommon for a club to receive free or discounted medical 
care for its players from its chosen team physicians.4  Such symbiotic 
economic relationships may adversely affect the quality of sports medicine 
care provided to professional athletes and jeopardize their health if the team’s 
need for an injured player’s services interferes with the team physician’s 
 
* Professor of Law and Director, National Sports Law Institute, Marquette University Law 
School.  I want to express my gratitude to Professor Nicolas Terry for inviting me to participate in 
this symposium and to Matt Weiss, a third-year student at Marquette University Law School, for 
his research assistance in connection with this article. 
 1. E.g., MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 2003–2006 BASIC 
AGREEMENT 217, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf [hereinafter MLB 
AGREEMENT].  The regulations that constitute a part of Major League Baseball’s Uniform Player 
Contract provide that the club is responsible for the cost of “reasonable medical and hospital 
expenses incurred by reason of [a player’s] injury and during the term of [his] contract or for a 
period of up to two years from the date of initial treatment for such injury.”  Id. 
 2. Steve P. Calandrillo, Sports Medicine Conflicts: Team Physicians vs. Athlete Patients, 50 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 185, 190–91 (2005). 
 3. Id. at 192. 
 4. Id. 
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medical judgment regarding the appropriate treatment and when the player 
may safely return to play. 
There is a unique relationship among a club, its players, and the team 
physician.5  The club seeks to win games and maximize profits, but must 
comply with its contractual obligations to the team’s players.  The players want 
to maximize their on-field performance to help the team win and enhance their 
individual economic rewards.  Injured players want to return to play quickly, 
but they do not want to suffer serious or permanently debilitating health effects 
caused by improper medical treatment or by resuming play too soon.  The team 
physician has the potentially conflicting responsibilities of providing medical 
care to the players and protecting their health while also facilitating the club’s 
ability to win games by having its best players on the field. 
Both the club and its players rely on the team physician’s expertise and 
judgment in sports medicine matters.  A player generally has a contractual 
obligation to submit to medical care and treatment deemed necessary by the 
team’s chosen physicians,6 with the right to receive a second medical opinion 
from a group of designated medical specialists (the cost of which is paid by the 
club).7  Courts recognize that the team physician serves as the “gatekeeper” to 
the playing-field and that his or her medical opinion deserves appropriate 
deference.  As one court explained, “it will be the rare case regarding 
participation in athletics where a court may substitute its judgment for that of 
the . . . team physicians.”8  
A team physician’s “judgment should be governed only by medical 
considerations.”9  Although facilitating an injured athlete’s ability to return to 
play is one objective, the team physician’s paramount duty should be to protect 
 
 5. See Nick DiCello, Note, No Pain, No Gain, No Compensation: Exploiting Professional 
Athletes Through Substandard Medical Care Administered by Team Physicians, 49 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 507, 536 (2001).  As this commentator has observed: 
Professional sports franchises as employers exercise a much greater level of control over 
athletes than do employers outside the sports entertainment industry.  For example, a 
professional athlete may not change employers unless he is traded, and professional 
teams, unlike other employers, retain total control over the health of the athletes. 
Id. 
 6. E.g., MLB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 217.  The Basic Agreement states that a 
player, when requested by his club, “must submit to a complete physical examination at the 
expense of the Club, and if necessary to treatment by a regular physician or dentist in good 
standing.”  Id.  It also provides that “the Club shall have the right to designate the doctors and 
hospitals furnishing such medical and hospital services” to injured players.  Id. 
 7. E.g., id. at 45–46 (“[T]he Clubs shall provide an updated, accepted listing of medical 
specialists . . . to whom Players may upon their request go for diagnosis and a second medical 
evaluation of an employment related illness or injury being treated by the Club physician.”). 
 8. Knapp v. Nw. Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 485 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Pahulu v. Univ. of 
Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (D. Kan. 1995). 
 9. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL 
ETHICS § 3.06 (2004–05). 
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players’ health and safety by providing high-quality sports medicine care and 
treatment.10  Nevertheless, team physicians encounter competing loyalties and 
inherent conflicts of interest.  Extreme time-sensitive needs for an injured 
player’s services may mean that the physician is pressured by team officials to 
place the team’s needs ahead of medical considerations necessary to protect the 
player’s health and safety.11  In addition, injured players may be willing to 
sacrifice their health by pressuring the team physician to provide medical 
clearance for them to return to play.12 
Unless statutorily excluded from coverage, a professional team’s players 
are “employees”13 who are entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for 
injuries occurring within the scope of their employment.14  In states in which 
professional athletes are covered by workers’ compensation laws, both the 
player’s original playing field injury and an aggravated injury caused by the 
team physician’s improper medical treatment are compensable injuries.15  A 
professional player’s additional or enhanced injury caused by the team 
physician’s medical malpractice is compensable because, like the original 
injury, it is considered to be sustained in the course of employment.16 
In states where professional athletes are covered by applicable workers’ 
compensation laws, clubs tend to designate their team physician as an 
“employee.”17  An employment relationship is established, often at the 
insistence of the team physician’s medical malpractice insurer, primarily to 
provide immunity from players’ tort suits.18  As a co-employee, the team 
physician is immune from tort liability for improper medical care provided to a 
 
 10. Matthew J. Mitten, Emerging Legal Issues in Sports Medicine: A Synthesis, Summary, 
and Analysis, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 5, 8–9 (2002); see also Calandrillo, supra note 2, at 188–89. 
 11. Calandrillo, supra note 2, at 192; Barry R. Furrow, The Problem of the Sports Doctor: 
Serving Two (Or Is It Three or Four?) Masters, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 165, 171 (2005). 
 12. See generally Matthew J. Mitten, Team Physicians and Competitive Athletes: Allocating 
Legal Responsibility for Athletic Injuries, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 129, 133–36 (1993). 
 13. Bryant v. Fox, 515 N.E.2d 775, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding, as a matter of law, 
professional football players are “employees rather than independent contractors”). 
 14. See generally 2 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION LAW § 22.04[1][b] (2005) [hereinafter LARSON & LARSON]; Benjamin T. 
Boscolo & Gerald Herz, Professional Athletes and the Law of Workers’ Compensation: Rights 
and Remedies, in 3 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 17:3 (Gary A. Uberstine et 
al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Boscolo & Herz]. 
 15. See, e.g., DePiano v. Montreal Baseball Club, Ltd., 663 F. Supp. 116, 117–18 (W.D. Pa. 
1987) (recognizing that improper medical care may fit into intentional injury exception to New 
York’s Workers’ Compensation Act); Bayless v. Phila. Nat’l League Club, 472 F. Supp. 625, 
629, 631 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff’d mem., 615 F.2d 1352 (3d Cir. 1980); Brinkman v. Buffalo Bills 
Football Club, 433 F. Supp. 699, 702 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). 
 16. Bayless, 472 F. Supp. at 629–30; Komel v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 372 N.E.2d 842, 
844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977). 
 17. See, e.g., Daniels v. Seattle Seahawks, 968 P.2d 883, 885 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). 
 18. E.g., id. 
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player within the physician’s scope of employment with the club.19  In other 
words, a professional athlete is precluded from bringing a malpractice claim 
against the team physician for negligent medical care that aggravates or 
exacerbates his original injury.20 
The developing judicial construction of the co-employee doctrine to 
encompass team physicians creates a disincentive to adequately protect 
professional athletes’ health and to serve effectively as a “gatekeeper.”  
Although workers’ compensation benefits do not provide full recovery for all 
harm caused by the team physician’s negligent treatment of a player’s injury 
(i.e., the full economic value of a player’s lost wages and pain and suffering),21 
most courts hold that these benefits are the player’s exclusive remedy. 
In Hendy v. Losse,22 a professional football player sued the team physician 
for negligently diagnosing and treating his knee injury suffered during a game 
and for advising him to continue playing football, allegedly causing him to 
aggravate the injury.23  Dismissing his claims, the California Supreme Court 
held that the state’s workers’ compensation law bars tort suits between co-
employees for injuries caused within the scope of employment.24  The Court 
found that the player and team physician were both employed by the San 
Diego Chargers club and that the physician acted within the scope of his 
employment by “provid[ing] medical care for injuries that are inherent in the 
nature of plaintiff’s employment.”25 
 
 19. This legal doctrine, whose parameters vary by jurisdiction, generally provides that 
workers’ compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy available to an injured employee and 
prohibits a tort suit against a co-employee who caused the injury (except for intentional wrongs).  
Bryant v. Fox, 515 N.E.2d 775, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (“[T]he exclusive-remedy provision bars 
an employee from bringing a common-law negligence action against a co-employee.”).  See 
generally 6 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 14, § 112.02[1][b], at 112-7–112-10.1. 
 20. The workers’ compensation co-employee doctrine also immunizes the club from 
vicarious liability in tort for its team physician’s medical malpractice.  Mitten, supra note 10, at 
45.  In the relatively few jurisdictions where professional athletes are excluded from workers’ 
compensation coverage and are not barred from bringing tort suits against their employer or co-
employees, the team physician is usually designated as an “independent contractor” in an effort to 
prevent the club from being vicariously liable for medical malpractice.  See DiCello, supra note 
5, at 536. 
 21. Two commentators observe that “[p]rofessional athletes, because of their high salaries, 
frequently are entitled to workers’ compensation benefits at the maximum level.  The maximum 
compensation rates are so low relative to athletes’ salaries that they are not adequately 
compensated for their injuries under workers’ compensation.”  Boscolo & Herz, supra note 14, § 
17:5, at 17-12. 
 22. 819 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1991). 
 23. Id. at 3–4. 
 24. Id. at 12–13. 
 25. Id. at 3, 13.  However, the court stated: “If a co-employee provides medical services 
other than those contemplated by the employee’s employment and in so doing is not acting for the 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] TEAM PHYSICIANS AS CO-EMPLOYEES 215 
The player argued that his malpractice action should be permitted because 
the team physician’s “duties as a professional are separate from the 
employment relationship.”26  However, the Court rejected this contention by 
construing the statute to provide only workers’ compensation benefits as the 
exclusive remedy against a co-employee who causes injury while acting within 
the scope of employment.27  The Court reasoned that the objective of the 
workers’ compensation statute is to prevent California employers from being 
held directly liable for workers’ compensation benefits and vicariously liable 
for tort judgments against its employees.28 
Similarly, in Daniels v. Seattle Seahawks,29 a Washington appellate court 
held that the Seattle Seahawks’ team physician was immune from a 
malpractice suit by one of the players he treated.30  Before 1991, the team 
physician was an independent contractor who had a fee-for-service agreement 
with the club.31  Thereafter, at the insistence of his malpractice insurance 
carrier, the club restructured this relationship and made him a part-time 
employee, although he continued to have a private orthopedic practice.32  His 
employment relationship stated that he “will be solely responsible for 
exercising his independent medical judgment as to all decisions on medical 
care and methods of treatment of Seattle Seahawks employees,” but provided 
the club with the right to direct and control his duties and working hours.33 
Even though the team physician was engaged in the independent 
profession of medicine without being subject to the club’s control or direction 
when providing medical care to its players, the court ruled that the physician 
was immune from tort liability as a matter of law because he was in the “same 
employ” as the plaintiff-player.34  In other words, tort immunity existed under 
 
employer, he or she no longer enjoys the ‘immunity’ from suit which section 3601 creates for acts 
which are within the scope of employment.”  Id. at 12. 
 26. Id. at 11. 
 27. Hendy, 819 P.2d at 12. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 968 P.2d 883 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). 
 30. Id. at 887–88. 
 31. Id. at 885. 
 32. Id.  The club paid its team physician an annual salary and provided him with the 
necessary office space, tools, and equipment to provide on-site medical services for its players.  
Id.  It also provided accounting and tax services relating to this aspect of his medical practice, but 
did not provide him with health insurance, sick leave, vacation pay, life insurance, or retirement 
benefits.  Id.; cf. Bryant v. Fox, 515 N.E.2d 775, 777–79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (although team 
physician found not to be club employee, case is instructive regarding how to structure 
relationship between club and physician so it will be judicially recognized as employment). 
 33. Daniels, 968 P.2d at 885. 
 34. Id. at 887–88. 
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Washington’s workers’ compensation co-employee doctrine because both 
physician and player were employed by the Seahawks club.35 
In my opinion, a team physician should not have immunity from 
malpractice merely because he or she is characterized as an “employee.”  
Whether designated as either an “employee” or an independent contractor, the 
same inherent conflicts exist.  Regardless of how he or she is characterized, the 
team physician has an ethical and legal duty to provide appropriate sports 
medicine care and recommendations to the club’s players based solely on 
medical considerations.  If the team physician breaches this duty, the co-
employee doctrine should not provide a shield from tort liability for harm 
caused to professional athletes.36  Rather than getting blanket immunity under 
state workers’ compensation laws, team physicians should be accountable if 
their malpractice causes harm to players whose health and safety are entrusted 
to them. 
Courts recognize that it is not necessarily unreasonable for workers’ 
compensation laws to be applied differently to professional athletes than other 
employees.  For example, excluding professional athletes from workers’ 
compensation benefits, or providing them with only reduced benefits, does not 
deny them equal protection of the law.37  As one court observed, 
“[P]rofessional athletes willfully hold themselves out to risk of frequent, 
repetitive and serious injury in exchange for lucrative compensation.”38  
However, professional athletes suffer greater uncompensated loss than typical 
employees when negligent medical treatment exacerbates their playing-field 
injuries.  Although they voluntarily assume the inherent risks of injury from 
playing a sport, professional athletes should not be required to involuntarily 
 
 35. Id.; see also Lotysz v. Montgomery, 766 N.Y.S.2d 28, 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) 
(holding that the New York workers’ compensation statute barred a player’s malpractice claims 
against team physician when he obtained medical treatment “solely by reason of his employment 
with the Jets, and not as a member of the general public”). 
 36. Other commentators advocate this position.  See, e.g., Teresa Herbert, Are Player 
Injuries Adequately Compensated?, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 243, 276 (2000) (“A physician should not 
be allowed to treat a player with any less care than he treats his other patients.  If he does, 
workers’ compensation should not deny a player a right of recourse that is available to any other 
injured patient.”); James D. Young, Liability for Team Physician Malpractice: A New Burden 
Shifting Approach, 27 RUTGERS L. REC. 4 (2003) (“[A]ny notion that a [team] doctor’s co-
employee status will shield his liability to a patient he negligently treats should similarly be 
removed.”); DiCello, supra note 5, at 536 (“Application of the co-employee immunity doctrine in 
this instance encourages less than competent medical treatment because no real threat of liability 
influences the physician.  An injured professional athlete patient should have the right to the same 
claims against a doctor[] as does the injured non-athlete patient.”). 
 37. Rudolph v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd., 447 So. 2d 284, 291–92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) 
(exclusion from benefits); Lyons v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 803 A.2d 857, 860–62 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2002) (reduction in benefits). 
 38. Lyons, 803 A.2d at 862. 
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bear the economic costs of aggravated injuries and accompanying pain and 
suffering caused by the team physician’s malpractice. 
A unique relationship exists between the team physician and a professional 
athlete vis-à-vis a company physician and the company’s employee, which 
justifies non-application of the co-employee bar to tort immunity in the former 
situation.  Unlike company physicians, team physicians may encounter 
pressure to recommend and/or provide medical treatment that furthers the 
employer’s (team’s) immediate need for an employee’s (player’s) services 
rather than provide treatment in the best interests of the athlete’s health.  
Potential tort liability creates an important legal incentive for the team 
physician not to succumb to such pressures, which are inherent in professional 
sports. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals opinion in Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings 
Football Club, LLC39 illustrates the appropriate limits on judicial application of 
the workers’ compensation co-employee doctrine necessary to encourage the 
provision of sports medicine care that adequately protects the health and safety 
of professional athletes.  The court appropriately recognizes that a sports 
medicine care provider’s status as a co-employee should not ipso facto confer 
tort immunity.40 
This case arose out of the 2001 death of Korey Stringer, a former 
Minnesota Vikings football player, caused by complications from heatstroke 
suffered during the club’s preseason training camp.41  In a wrongful death 
action, Stringer’s heirs alleged that several Vikings’ employees, including the 
assistant athletic trainer and coordinator of medical services, provided 
improper emergency medical care to Stringer when he suffered heatstroke.42  
These defendants argued that they were entitled to co-employee tort immunity 
under Minnesota’s workers’ compensation statute.43 
The court held that co-employees have tort immunity only when carrying 
out their employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace for its 
employees, which is the basis for imposing strict liability for workplace 
injuries on employers.44  However, there is no immunity if a co-employee 
owes a personal duty of care arising out of his provision of medical care to a 
fellow employee that is “not pursuant to the employer’s nondelegable duty to 
provide a safe workplace.”45 
 
 39. 686 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 705 N.W.2d 746 (Minn. 
2005). 
 40. See id. at 549–50. 
 41. Id. at 547. 
 42. Id. at 547–48. 
 43. Id. at 548. 
 44. Stringer, 686 N.W.2d at 549. 
 45. Id. at 550. 
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The court ruled that the emergency medical care rendered to Stringer by 
the club’s assistant athletic trainer and its coordinator of medical services “did 
not involve general workplace safety or the removal of workplace hazards . . . 
pursuant to their employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace.”46  
Rather, their conduct gave rise to an independent personal duty that exists 
regardless of their co-employee relationship with Stringer.47  The court 
explained that “under some circumstances, personal duty may be coextensive 
with employment duties.  But not every action taken by an employee is in 
furtherance of the employer’s nondelegable duty to provide a safe 
workplace.”48 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, held that defendants’ 
“obligations to Stringer directly resulted from their employment by the Vikings 
and the Vikings’s efforts to provide a safe workplace for their players.”49  
Thus, “any duty they had toward Stringer did not exist absent their 
employment status”50 and the defendants are immune from tort liability.51 
Two dissenting justices expressed “doubt that a scope of employment test 
is workable . . . where the co-employees’ job is to provide [medical] care 
directly to employees.”52  In their view, sports medicine care of an injured 
athlete is not conduct merely “taken in the performance of the employer’s 
nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace.”53  They expressed concern 
that limiting co-employee liability to acts outside the course and scope of 
employment provides tort immunity “essentially coextensive with that of the 
employer,”54 although the co-employee does not provide any corresponding 
quid pro quo injury benefits as does the employer. 
The dissenters also cited the following policy arguments weighing against 
co-employee tort immunity: “the injured employee is entitled to be fully 
 
 46. Id. at 550–51.  In contrast, the court held that another defendant, the club’s head athletic 
trainer, was protected by co-employee immunity because his alleged tortious conduct arose out of 
the Vikings’ nondelegable duty to ensure safe work conditions for its players.  Id. at 551.  This 
defendant allegedly was aware that Stringer suffered heat exhaustion on July 30 and was 
responsible for accurately weighing the players before and after practice to measure their fluid 
loss and determine whether it was safe for them to practice, but he did not ensure that these 
measurements were accurate and did not prevent Stringer from practicing on July 31, the day he 
suffered heatstroke.  Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 762 (Minn. 2005). 
 50. Id. 
 51. The Minnesota appellate court held that the defendants are not subject to tort liability 
because their conduct was not grossly negligent, which is the co-employee liability standard 
established by the Minnesota workers’ compensation statute.  Stringer, 686 N.W.2d at 551–52. 
 52. Stringer, 705 N.W.2d at 767. 
 53. Id. at 763. 
 54. Id. at 767. 
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compensated for his injuries by all but the employer; the co-employee 
tortfeasor should not be relieved of the consequences of his wrongdoing; 
extending immunity to the co-employee would encourage fellow employees to 
neglect their duties[.]”55 
To establish a uniform rule not dependent on varying judicial 
interpretations of state workers’ compensation laws, the players union should 
insist on a provision in the league collective bargaining agreement requiring 
that team physicians be designated as independent contractors rather than club 
employees.  Removing the unwarranted protection conferred by co-employee 
tort immunity would enable a professional athlete to seek full recovery for 
harm caused by the team physician’s negligent care and treatment of his 
injuries.  It would not impose strict liability on team physicians for sports 
medicine care that aggravates a player’s preexisting injury or necessarily mean 
that the team physician had committed medical malpractice in such cases.  To 
establish liability, the player would have the burden of proving that the team 
physician’s medical recommendations or treatment deviated from reasonable, 
customary, or accepted sports medicine care and proximately caused his 
aggravated injury.56 
It is fair to assume that, in most instances, the team physician provides 
appropriate sports medicine care to the club’s players despite pressure to 
provide treatment that enables a professional player to return to play as quickly 
as possible.  Physicians who serve in this capacity generally are very skilled 
and reputable clinicians who have significant professional and economic 
incentives to provide high quality sports medicine care to the team’s players.  
Failing to do so may result in a highly publicized malpractice lawsuit by a 
professional athlete, which likely will adversely affect the physician’s private 
practice and increase the cost of malpractice insurance.  Obtaining second 
opinions from medical specialists not directly affiliated with the club also 
should reduce instances of improper medical recommendations and care by the 
team physician. 
Nevertheless, when the team physician fails to provide appropriate medical 
care and thus causes aggravated injury and diminished playing skills, a 
professional athlete should have a tort remedy to recover for the lost or reduced 
economic value of his career, as well as other damages to compensate for harm 
such as pain and suffering.  Even if a professional athlete may recover 
workers’ compensation benefits for an aggravated injury caused by medical 
malpractice, these benefits do not provide full compensation for the team 
physician’s independent tortious conduct.  To avoid double recovery for the 
harm caused by negligent medical treatment, it may be appropriate to reduce a 
professional athlete’s tort judgment against the team physician by the amount 
 
 55. Id. at 764. 
 56. Mitten, supra note 10, at 8–13. 
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of workers’ compensation benefits received as a result of any aggravated injury 
caused by the team physician’s medical malpractice.57 
To avoid liability for the payment of both workers’ compensation benefits 
and tort damages, the club generally should not be vicariously liable for its 
team physician’s malpractice.  Otherwise, the primary policy justification for 
the co-employee tort immunity doctrine—namely, employer strict liability for 
workplace injuries in lieu of vicarious liability for employee torts that injure 
fellow employees—would be undermined.58  Holding the club vicariously 
liable, which is a form of strict tort liability, might encourage lay club officials 
to attempt to direct and control the treatment that the team physician provides 
to injured players.  This undesirable consequence could inhibit the team 
physician from independently exercising his or her medical judgment and 
result in treatment that adversely affects an injured player’s health. 
On the other hand, to create an incentive to ensure that professional 
athletes will receive appropriate sports medicine care, the club should be 
directly liable for its own negligence in connection with the hiring or retention 
of its team physician.59  The club should also be liable for interfering with its 
team physician’s medical judgment or exercising substantial control over 
medical treatment that causes aggravated harm to an injured player.60  To avoid 
 
 57. For a general discussion of the “collateral source rule” and its abolition or limitation in 
various jurisdictions, see 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 380, at 1058–61 (2001). 
 58. As one court explained, this doctrine has another policy basis: “[L]ike the employer, a 
co-employee is involved in a compromise of rights; among employees, the quid pro quo is that 
each employee surrenders his common law right to bring tort actions against other employees in 
return for immunity to their tort suits.”  Deller v. Naymick, 342 S.E.2d 73, 76 (W. Va. 1985).  It 
is relatively infrequent that professional players tortiously injure team physicians, so this is not a 
major concern.  However, to further the objective of maintaining reciprocal rights among 
employees, it would be appropriate to allow the team physician to assert tort claims against the 
team’s players. 
 59. However, a professional sports team has a strong incentive to select well-qualified team 
physicians to provide medical care to its players to protect its substantial economic investment in 
them. 
 60. See, e.g., Krueger v. S.F. Forty Niners, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579, 584–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) 
(finding NFL club and team physician liable for fraud in connection with medical treatment 
rendered to injured player that caused permanent knee injury); Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey 
Club Ltd., 124 D.L.R.3d 228, 232–33, 253 (B.C. Ct. App. 1981) (finding NHL club liable for 
influencing injured player’s medical treatment and requiring him to continue playing, which 
caused disabling spinal cord injury, and finding player to be 20% contributorily negligent for 
continuing to play and failing to use reasonable care to protect his health).  Alternatively, one 
commentator recommends that there be a rebuttable presumption that the club is jointly liable for 
damages if the team physician negligently treated an athlete. Young, supra note 35.  He asserts 
that by “shifting the burden to the team to prove it was not controlling the doctor, the team’s 
incentive to force injured players to play or to encourage physicians to be less candid regarding 
the extent of injuries would be minimized.”  Id.  The club could escape liability by proving that 
its management did not exercise any control over the medical treatment rendered by its team 
physician.  Id.; see Wilson v. Vancouver Hockey Club, 5 D.L.R.4th 282, 290 (B.C. 1983) 
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the prospect of double recovery for the same harm, the player must elect to 
receive either workers’ compensation benefits or to pursue a tort claim.61 
 
(finding NHL club not vicariously liable because its management did not exercise any control 
over team physician’s negligent treatment of its player). 
 61. Major league professional athletes typically have contractual injury protection 
guarantees that require their respective clubs to pay their full salary for the season in which their 
injury occurs.  Major League Baseball players and National Basketball Association players may 
have multi-year guaranteed contracts that require full payment of their salaries if they are unable 
to play because of an injury suffered within the scope of their employment.  E.g., MLB BASIC 
AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 28.  Any tort judgment against the club should be reduced by the 
amount of these contractual payments. 
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